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INTRODUCTION 
For the purposes of this Symposium, I was assigned the task of defending the 
current legal standard for assessing online service providers’ secondary liability for 
trademark infringement.1  In other words, I was asked to defend the “status quo.”  I 
think it is safe to say that, at an academic conference, most people would not pick 
that position as their first option—it’s like being asked to discuss how to prepare 
meatloaf at a conference on new trends in the culinary arts. 
That said, with respect to the current law in the United States, I don’t completely 
shy away from the position.  To be clear, my position is not that the current state of 
affairs is perfect.  There are real challenges facing brand owners, challenges that 
I—and Microsoft—truly understand.  Microsoft is an online service provider, and 
our online services, such as Bing, Skype, OneDrive, Office 365 and Xbox Live, are 
both important lines of business and valuable services that hundreds of millions of 
customers around the world rely on every day.  At the same time, Microsoft owns 
some of the world’s most valuable brands and is a victim of substantial online 
infringement.  Our infringement battles run the gamut from pirated and counterfeit 
software to counterfeit hardware, such as computer peripherals and game consoles.  
The damage caused by these infringements is estimated to be in the billions of 
dollars annually.  Moreover, Microsoft expects our acquisition of Nokia’s phone 
business to only increase our counterfeiting and IP enforcement challenges.2 
As my background demonstrates, I understand the importance of effective 
enforcement for brands, and the challenges brands face in getting the job done.  For 
that reason, I believe that we should carefully consider all reasonable proposals that 
would protect against consumer harm and enable trademark owners to more 
effectively protect their brands from commercial threats.  But before turning to 
legislative solutions that disrupt the current legal regime, I think we must consider 
two big picture questions:  (1) What have been the results of the current regime?  
Are platforms being rewarded for good behavior and held liable for bad?  Are there 
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greater opportunities for effective enforcement under current law, or is the system 
inherently broken?  (2) What are the likely results of a change?  How would a 
higher duty of care impact the vitality of the Internet?  What is the likely impact on 
the integrity of the intellectual property system?  What will the economic impact 
be?  Reviewing the answers to these questions will help us to evaluate the potential 
pros and cons of a change to the current legal standard. 
I.  THE CURRENT REGIME 
As developed through federal case law, the law of the land in the United States 
is that for an online service provider to be held secondarily liable for trademark 
infringement, the provider must either intentionally induce another to infringe, or it 
must continue to offer its services to an infringer with specific, contemporary 
knowledge that the infringement is occurring.3 
To bring real-world color to the way this law has been applied, we can look at 
the facts surrounding two cases:  the Tiffany case,4 and a recently decided case 
involving the brand Chloé in California.5  The Tiffany case involved the sale of 
counterfeit Tiffany goods on eBay’s e-commerce platform.6  eBay successfully 
defended itself against Tiffany’s trademark infringement suit, in part based on an 
impressive list of actions that eBay took to partner with Tiffany and other brand 
owners to support their enforcement efforts.7  Among other things, eBay:  (1) 
maintained a robust “notice and takedown” system and typically processed 
takedowns very quickly; (2) implemented a repeat infringer policy; (3) suspended 
tens of thousands of sellers every year who were suspected of engaging in 
infringing conduct and (4) promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as 
counterfeit via its notice and takedown system.8 
eBay went further than typical notice and takedown best practices, including 
establishing dedicated pages on its site where brand owners could post educational 
materials for consumers, and by implementing a “fraud engine” to proactively 
search for and remove listings that violated its policies.9  These are precisely the 
kinds of actions that brand owners want to encourage platforms to take, and the 
court’s holding rewarded eBay for taking them. 
Contrast that case with a recent California case, Chloé SAS v. Sawabeh 
Information Services Co.  Similarly to the Tiffany plaintiffs, Chloé and other 
Richemont-owned luxury good brands sought to hold the owner of TurnKey, an 
online “swap meet,” liable for hosting the offer for sale of counterfeit goods on its 
 
 3. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Chloé SAS v. Sawabeh Info. Servs. Co., No. CV 11-04147 GAF (MANx), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 187398 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013). 
 6. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 96. 
 7. See id. at 109. 
 8. See id. at 98−100. 
 9. See id. 
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website.10  Chloé worked with an investigator posing as a seller to build a record 
regarding the platform’s actions, including:  (1) upon notice by the investigator-
seller that goods being posted for sale were counterfeit, the platform affirmatively 
responded that it was okay for the seller to be doing that, and that indeed many of 
the goods on its site were “replicas”;11 (2) the platform assisted the investigator 
with keyword optimization to drive traffic for users actively seeking the counterfeit 
listings12 and (3) the platform modified ad copy for the listing to change the 
characterization of goods from “replicas” to “fashion handbags,” which the court 
interpreted as evidence that TurnKey was trying to hide the real nature of the goods 
being sold.13  Compared to eBay’s practices, this was a tough record to defend, 
and—not surprisingly—the Chloé case resulted in secondary liability for 
TurnKey.14 
These cases illustrate that in most cases the courts are getting it right.  The 
current standard has resulted in decisions that reward good behavior and punish bad 
behavior by platforms.  Platforms like eBay have created multiple measures to 
protect brand owners, including building systems that allow for notice and 
takedown, despite the absence of a Digital Millennium Copyright Act-like duty to 
do so.  As a brand owner, we have worked closely with eBay and have found them 
to be good partners and highly effective at addressing our takedown requests. 
As an online service provider, Microsoft too has such a system, and we are 
proud of our response times across our services.  Our experience is that most other 
reputable online service platforms—and even some less-than-reputable ones—have 
implemented similar notice-and-takedown systems that have proven effective.  For 
platforms that do not responsibly partner with brand owners to receive and address 
notices of infringement, try to thwart notice-and-takedown efforts, or take an active 
role in promoting counterfeiting, the current legal regime provides room for 
liability. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the courts seem to be getting it right, the current 
system nevertheless places a heavy burden on brand owners (like Microsoft) to 
identify and provide notice to online platforms.  Brand owners may want a solution 
that lessens the difficulties of accomplishing this goal, or that places a greater duty 
on online service providers to combat infringement even in the absence of notice 
from brand owners.  As a result, one of the ideas gaining some traction among 
brand owners is to increase the duty of care for online service providers. 
This approach would likely have unintended and undesirable results.  But before 
moving to a discussion of those results, I would like to share how Microsoft has 
worked within the current legal regime as a rights owner to combat online 
infringement.  We have employed what we believe are the right resources and the 
right strategy, which has reduced online infringement to a controlled level from 
 
 10. See Chloé, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187398, at *1−2. 
 11. Id. at *10. 
 12. Id. at *3. 
 13. See id. at *10. 
 14. See id. at *11. 
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what was once considered a significant threat to our business. 
The first task is to understand the scope of the problem—how to measure it and 
how to measure the effectiveness of enforcement efforts.  Nearly five years ago, 
Microsoft implemented a new strategy for combatting online infringement by 
leveraging notice and takedown in a more significant way than it had before, with a 
particular focus on piracy.  This strategy, of course, has required some hard work.  
In our last fiscal year, Microsoft took action to remove about 19 million 
infringements from the Internet, issuing an average of 1.5 million takedown notices 
per month to online service providers.  Although that is a high number, Microsoft is 
not singularly focused on quantity; measuring success based on quantity would be a 
fool’s errand, because we know that at any given time, tens of thousands of 
websites offer access to pirated Microsoft products.  So above all, our strategy 
focuses on relevancy. 
In the piracy space, we assess relevancy in relation to how long it takes an 
average user to find the infringing content, not in relation to the absolute number of 
infringements.  And through efforts that analyze Internet traffic patterns and user 
habits, we estimate that it now takes an average user several minutes to find 
infringing Microsoft content online.  Given the behavior of Internet users, they 
typically give up within those several minutes, which means that we are targeting 
the most harmful instances of infringement. 
Relevancy is also the focus of our brand-specific enforcement efforts, such as 
infringement in online marketplaces and domain name disputes.  In those cases, we 
utilize tools that assist us in finding and ranking infringements based on the 
relevancy factors we have identified, so that we are able to take rapid action against 
the highest priority infringements, like infringements that associate our brands with 
pornography, or that are the most confusing for consumers. 
We also know, of course, that the worst infringers typically infringe more than 
once.  For example, parties that own one infringing domain name often own many.  
Parties posting infringing apps often will publish more than one, and a party 
making one instance of pirated software available will frequently also make the 
software widely available.  Zeroing in on those parties’ locations gives us insight 
into “hot zones” of infringement.  Our enforcement team has created visualization 
tools that help us locate these hot zones and focus our enforcement efforts 
accordingly. 
Another best practice is a technology that we have used to target problematic 
domain name uses.  Current domain name registration rules do not provide an 
effective remedy for inaccurate or masked registrant information.  This often 
renders it impossible to identify the party behind an infringing website, or to run a 
reverse WHOIS report and identify that party’s other domains.  However, we have 
been able to use a tool that identifies the IP address for a bad site and identifies IPs 
“nearby,” which can find obviously related websites.  This tool helps us better 
identify related infringement and prioritize our enforcement efforts, mainly by 
using the notice and takedown systems of the appropriate platforms. We also 
follow our own notice procedures for our own platforms as if we are dealing with 
an external party, which provides us with important data and a feedback loop of 
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how well our own takedown system is working. 
Of course, all of this progress came at some cost, and I know that brand owners 
worry about the expenses of enforcement.  Microsoft certainly does.  My response 
is that brand protection has always required expenditure of resources, and it is 
unreasonable to expect anything different in the context of the Internet.  Just as 
stores install alarm systems to protect their merchandise, office buildings hire 
guards to deter vandalism and brand owners fund undercover operations offline, 
brand owners simply need to invest in online tools to protect their trademarks.  
With some investment in the right tools, this type of enforcement is cost effective, 
and it scales well.  For example, the cost per infringing file that Microsoft had 
taken down last year was literally pennies—a very worthwhile investment. 
The lesson here is that today, the law and the courts are generally getting it right.  
Legal precedent that rewards good behavior and punishes bad has encouraged most 
major platforms to create workable takedown systems.  With the implementation of 
rights owner best practices—which I believe is a woefully underlooked area of 
opportunity—those owners can leverage these systems and start to contain the 
infringement threat to their businesses.  In doing so, they can protect consumers 
from confusion, at scale and at reasonable cost, which is the ultimate policy goal of 
trademark law. 
II.  THOUGHTS ON ADOPTING A CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 
STANDARD 
I will now turn briefly to what I think would result from a change in the law to 
impose a higher duty of care on service providers—specifically, the proposal to 
impose a constructive notice standard.  Under this proposal, an online service 
provider would be liable for trademark infringement by a third-party user of the 
provider’s services even if the provider did not know of the infringement, but 
merely “should have known.” 
The constructive notice standard has been discussed in cases in the United 
States, and has most recently been raised by some stakeholders in light of recent 
revisions to the trademark law in China.15  Imposing liability without actual 
knowledge of infringement would mark a sharp departure from longstanding 
principles of secondary liability.  As the Second Circuit held in Tiffany, eBay had 
no affirmative duty to address such infringement unless it “knew or had reason to 
know of specific instances of actual infringement” by particular users of its site.16 
The constructive notice liability proposal would be a 180-degree departure from 
the Tiffany standard.  Before undertaking such a fundamental change, it is 
important to take a close look at its potential effects.  I will raise four issues that I 
think should give us substantial pause in considering such a proposal. 
 
 15. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106−09 (2d Cir. 2010); Joe Simone, 
Comments on the PRC Trademark Law Amendments, CHINA IPR (Jan. 27, 2013), http://chinaipr.com/ 
2013/01/27/comments-on-the-prc-trademark-law-amendments. 
 16. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
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First, a constructive notice standard assumes that online service providers have 
the ability to accurately identify trademark infringement on their sites.  As Tiffany 
and other cases demonstrate, this assumption is false.17  It is far more difficult to 
detect trademark infringement than copyright infringement, which can rely on 
digital fingerprinting technology (as YouTube does).18  That technology would be 
ineffective in the trademark context, because there are no clear reference copies to 
operate from, and there are many more fair and legitimate uses of brand names than 
there are of entire songs or movies. 
The problem, then, is that online service providers are not and cannot be 
trademark experts on the millions of products that might be offered or sold via their 
services, and they do not have the necessary expertise to distinguish between 
genuine and counterfeit goods or between legal and illegal resellers.  Unlike Justice 
Stewart’s observation about pornography,19 outsiders cannot “know it when they 
see it” in relation to trademark infringement.  The indicia of counterfeiting that are 
often suggested—such as the prices of counterfeits relative to retail pricing, the 
volume of sales by a single user, the quantity of an item offered and so on—are not 
robust or objective tests for identifying infringement.  Hence, brand owners are far 
more capable than service providers at identifying infringement of their own 
trademarks. 
Second, even if these approaches for identifying counterfeits were robust and 
reliable, they would require service providers to review the activities of thousands 
or even millions of users every day.  Because this infringement identification 
process cannot be fully automated, it cannot scale, so it would be prohibitively 
expensive and time consuming for any significant provider, such as eBay, which 
has millions of transactions daily.  At best, these additional costs would be passed 
on to consumers, but it is more likely that many innovative platforms would no 
longer have viable business models. 
Third, because online providers would often be unable to distinguish between 
legal and illegal trademark uses, and would naturally want to avoid untold liability, 
we can confidently predict that a constructive notice standard would lead them to 
resolve even remotely close questions about fair use in favor of removal.  This 
would imperil many important, legitimate and fair uses of trademarks, including 
uses that clearly enhance competition and have undeniable consumer benefits.  Any 
legal rule that results in a suppression of speech would understandably raise 
substantial concerns among “netizens,” and it bears noting that the value of free 
speech has been a major catalyst for the growth of the Internet and even political 
empowerment. 
Fourth, we need to take into account how such changes would affect the broader 
Internet from an economic perspective.  Online service providers—search engines, 
 
 17. See id. 
 18. See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/ 
2797370?hl=en (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 19. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (remarking, in 
reference to the determination of what qualifies as pornography, that “I know it when I see it”). 
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e-commerce platforms, app stores and others—have directly and indirectly created 
millions of jobs and sparked unprecedented innovation and consumer value.  The 
Internet is responsible for an astounding 21% of total GDP growth in mature 
markets over the last five years, according to a 2011 McKinsey study.20  Any new 
legal duties imposed on online service providers must not jeopardize these gains 
and imperil business online, but that is exactly what a constructive notice standard 
could do.  Forcing platforms to choose between uncertain but potentially enormous 
liability, or policing its users in a way that does not scale and that undermines the 
utility of the service, is no choice at all.  The current state of the law in the U.S. 
avoids both of these outcomes. 
Indeed, rather than disrupt the rules that we enjoy in the U.S.—which, after 
years of litigation, finally provide a degree of clarity about enforcement strategies 
to all players—the trademark bar should be focused on how to achieve similar 
clarity and consistency around intermediary liability abroad.  For instance, the 
European Union operates under the E-Commerce Directive, which creates an EU-
wide structure,21 but each Member State implements the Directive through its own 
laws.22  The lack of uniformity creates significant regulatory and compliance costs 
for online service providers while providing questionable benefit to brand owners. 
In short, a constructive notice standard would place an ineffective trademark 
enforcement system on the backs of consumers, the economy and society.  We can 
do better. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
I would like to conclude by emphasizing, again, that Microsoft recognizes the 
significant threat that online counterfeits can pose to brands.  We are dedicated to 
improving trademark enforcement to better protect companies—ourselves 
included—from bad actors online.  Indeed, we have demonstrated our interest in 
engaging in efforts to improve the system by negotiating and embracing voluntary 
measures that improve the position of brand owners.  In the trademark space, for 
instance, we partnered with several other leading display ad networks to develop a 
series of best practices to keep ads off of certain counterfeiting sites.23  We also 
participate with the nonprofit Center for Safe Internet Pharmacies, along with other 
online platforms.24  In the copyright space, we worked with stakeholders, including 
rights owners and platforms, to develop the User Generated Content Principles.25 
 
 20. MATTHIEU PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INTERNET MATTERS:  THE 
NET’S SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS, AND PROSPERITY, at viii (May 2011), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/internet_matters. 
 21. Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). 
 22. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-236/08–C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
 23. See WHITE HOUSE, BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR AD NETWORKS TO ADDRESS PIRACY 
AND COUNTERFEITING (2013), http://2013ippractices.com. 
 24. Members, CTR. FOR SAFE INTERNET PHARMACIES, http://www.safemedsonline.org/who-we-
are/members (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
 25. See PRINCIPLES FOR USER GENERATED CONTENT SERVICES (2013), http://ugcprinciples.com. 
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Similarly, to make progress in online trademark enforcement, rather than impose 
onerous and untested new liabilities, brands and online service providers should 
work together to develop best practices and technology that help all of us detect 
and remove infringing content as quickly as possible.  As we have found in 
practice, this focus can result in effective online enforcement under the current law. 
